|
The Self-Organisation of
Society - Part I
Acknowledgement:
This paper is a result of research undertaken
2. Society as a Dialectical System 2.1. Human Action Systems – The Relationship
of Society and Individuals Abstract (English) The aim of
this paper is to outline some aspects of the self-organisation of society based
on a dialectical methodology. On a very general level, society can be
characterised as a re-creative system: By mutual productive relationships of
social structures and actors, society can based on human activity and
creativity reproduce itself. Social structures are medium and outcome of social
actions. This is a synchronous description. Describing society in a diachronic
way, one can say that new order emerges in phases of instability and crisis.
Society can also be described as the unity of different qualitative moments
such as production, consumption, distribution, politics and culture because
human activity results in more permanent qualitative moments. A dialectical
analysis of society means to consider societal existence as a development
process. Dialectics means concretisation and speculation. Hence by ascending
from the abstract to the concrete (from the logic of essence to the logic of notion),
we discuss the economic self-organisation cycle of capitalism. This process of
capital accumulation results in the estrangement and exploitation of the human
being by the human being. Capitalist society is not a naturally given pattern,
but a historical system. The human being has the ability to consciously behave
towards the world, hence it’s possible to change the societal conditions in
such a way that true, well-rounded individuality can fully unfold. Abstract (Deutsch) Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist die Erläuterung einiger Aspekte der
Selbstorganisation der Gesellschaft auf der Basis einer dialektischen
Herangehensweise. Auf einer sehr allgemeinen Ebene kann Gesellschaft als
re-kreatives System charakterisiert werden: Durch wechselseitige, produktive
Verhältnisse von Gesellschaftsstrukturen und Akteuren kann sich die
Gesellschaft basierend auf menschlicher Aktivität und Kreativität selbst
reproduzieren. Soziale Strukturen sind Medium und Resultat des Handelns. Dabei
handelt es sich um eine synchrone Beschreibung. Wird Gesellschaft diachron
beschrieben, so kann gesagt werden, dass neue Ordnung in Phasen der Instabilität
und Krise emergiert. Gesellschaft kann auch als Einheit verschiedener
qualitativer Momente wie Produktion, Konsumtion, Distribution, Politik und
Kultur beschrieben werden, da menschliche Aktivitäten in dauerhaften
qualitativen Momenten resultieren. Eine dialektische Analyse der Gesellschaft
zu betreiben bedeutet, das gesellschaftliche Sein als Entwicklungsprozess
aufzufassen. Dialektik bedeutet Konkretisierung und Spekulation. Durch
Aufsteigen vom Abstrakten zum Konkreten (von der Wesenslogik zur Begriffslogik)
können wir den ökonomischen Selbstorganisationszyklus des Kapitalismus
beschreiben. Dieser Prozess der Kapitalakkumulation resultiert in der
Entfremdung und Ausbeutung des Menschen durch den Menschen. Die kapitalistische
Gesellschaft ist nicht natürlich gegeben, sondern ein historisches System. Der
Mensch hat die Fähigkeit, sich bewußt gegenüber der Welt zu verhalten, daher
ist es möglich, die gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen derart zu verändern, dass
sich wahre, allseitige Individualität voll entfalten kann. 1. Introduction
In the older natural sciences
one can still ignore that the topic are not only some things “on the outside“,
but things in “a world for us“. All objects are objects of human practice. In
quantum theory the neglect of the human being had to be given up and also in
the concept of self-organisation humans can’t simply be considered as outside
observers, they must be considered as participants in the process. Even more obvious is the fact of
participation, the impossibility of only an external position, in the
scientific analysis of the societal[i]
being of humans. If we took the position of only an external observer in
sociology, we wouldn’t be able to explain human behaviour adequately – but we
also don’t assume that human behaviour can only be understood by a single
actor, not by others. Human life is free – but always also limited in its
possibilities. There is neither absolute arbitrariness of behaviour nor
absolute arbitrary interpretation of human behaviour – but the comprehension of
society can’t simply copy methods from the natural sciences. Also an adoption
of modern concepts from the natural and general sciences which include the subject
of cognition is not sufficient. In this work we will use
different approaches to the problem. The chapters 2 and 3 vary in the way that
we describe society, this is done in chapter 2 according to rather traditional
sociological analysis as we consider society and the relationships of individuals
as object of analysis. In chapter 3 we acknowledge that also another approach
is needed for the subject as an object of cognition. We accept both approaches
and point out their mutual complementation. In chapter 2 we point out two
possibilities of subdividing the total system of society. On the one hand
society is considered as the unity of human beings or their actions (empirical
concept of society in chapter 2.1) and on the other hand society is considered
as the unity of different qualitative moments (society as category in chapter
2.2.). The two conceptions are connected by the fact that qualitative moments
of society such as the economy, politics and culture are based on human actions
and social relationships. The second conception shows that the specific
definiteness of quality (that changes historically) must result in a
concretisation of the various societal formations. This dialectical way of
cognition “from the abstract to the concrete” opens the way to a historical
approach and justifies the synchronous (systematic) and diachronic (historical)
descriptions of the structure of societal systems in the subchapters 2.1.2. and
2.1.3. 2. Society as a
Dialectical System
2.1. Human Action
Systems – The Relationship of Society and Individuals
2.1.1
What is Society?
Various meanings can be employed
for the term “society“. We use it in a specific way that shall be outlined. We
consider society the characterisation that delimits that which is specifically
human from other organic modes of organisation. All other characteristics of
the human being such as consciousness, labour as the foundation of reproduction
etc. are bound to sociality. Hence we also distinguish social from societal.
Social relationships and communities (Gemeinschaft) can already be found in the
world of animals – but no societies in the way we employ the term. A more specific definition of
what societal being is can be given if we compare it to historically older
forms of sociality which have resulted in society. We can’t cover anthropogenesis
in depth here (see Schlemm 2001a for more details), but we want to summarise
some important points: -
Although the emergence of the human being from the animal world took
many hundred thousands or million years (“animal-man-transition field”), human
beings differ from their animal ancestors and other animals qualitatively. An
appreciation of those qualities and abilities that animals don’t have, is not a
negation of the intrinsic value of other life-forms. -
Constitutive
for the qualitative difference of the way of organising life has been that human
beings e.g. for scavenging no longer simply used means (stick) for achieving
immediately given ends (catching of a fruit on a tree), but that they also
produce and preserve the means independent from immediate means, i.e. indirect
precaution, production and preservation (for details on this reversal of ends
and means see Holzkamp 1985, p. 173 and Zukunftswerkstatt 2002, see also
Leontjew 1985, pp. 149ff[ii]).
Such a reversal of ends and means has (thus far?) only taken place once on
planet earth, namely by the pre-human becoming human. Humans begin to
distinguish themselves from animals by starting to produce their means of
subsistence by which they are indirectly producing their actual material life
(Marx/Engels 1846: 21). -
Marx
pointed out that man like animals lives from inorganic nature, he must remain
in a continuing physical dialogue with nature in order to survive. Nature can
be considered as man’s inorganic body in the sense that nature is “a direct means
of life“ and “the matter, the object, and the tool of his [man’s] life
activity“ (Marx 1844: 516). Animals produce only their own immediate needs,
“animals produce one-sidedly, whereas man produces universally; they produce
only when immediate physical need compels them to do so, while man produces
even when he is free from physical need and truly produces only in freedom from
such need; they produce only themselves, while man reproduces the whole of
nature; their products belong immediately to their physical bodies, while man
freely confronts his own product. Animals produce only according to the
standards and needs of the species to which they belong, while man is capable
of producing according to the standards of every species and of applying to each
object its inherent standard; hence, man also produces in accordance with the
laws of beauty“ (Marx 1844: 517). In the production of his life which includes
the metabolism between society and nature and societal reciprocity, man as the
universal, objective species-being produces an objective world (gegenständliche
Welt) and reproduces nature and his species according to his purposes.
"The activity of the animal is not directed at the totality of these conditions [of a situation], but only at certain objects of its
biological needs. This is different with the human being”[iii]
(Leontjew 1985: 163, emphasis added). With the human being, history emerges:
“the more that human beings become removed from animals in the narrower sense
of the word, the more they make their own history consciously, the less becomes
the influence of unforeseen effects and uncontrolled forces of this history,
and the more accurately does the historical result correspond to the aim laid
down in advance“ (Engels 1875: 323). -
All
generally known specific characteristics of the human being such as
consciousness (based on a “Gnostic distance”, Holzkamp 1985: 236, towards the
given), language and labour are based on this “breakage of immediacy”
(“Durchbrechung der Unmittelbarkeit”; Leontjew 1987: 126; Holzkamp 1985: 193). -
With
the “breakage of immediacy” emerged a new form of socially mediated activities,
the
societal form of mediation of the life process. This means for the
single individual that the maintenance and development of his/her life is no
longer only confined to biological processes (including the ones of societal
realms), but takes place within societal structures. No human being can live
without this mediation by society because his/her individual-cognitive
abilities can only develop in mutual relationship with societal conditions. -
As
Friedrich Engels (1875, 1876) has shown, this breakage of immediacy started
with the erect posture in walking which resulted in the specialisation of the
hand which implies tools, tools imply production as human activities that
transform nature. A differentiation of certain bodily forms can result in other
organic differentiations. The specialisation of the hand resulted in labour and
the utilisation of nature. The emergence of labour and production resulted in a
co-evolution of society and consciousness. The genesis of man is due to a
dialectic of labour and human capabilities (hand, language, increase of brain
volume, consciousnes etc.) which have resulted in developments such as hunting,
stock farming, agriculture, metal processing, navigation, pottery, art,
science, legislation, politics etc. Idealistic conceptions of the development
of man argue that consciousness existed prior to human, societal beings, that’s
e.g. the case in traditional philosophy of consciousness. Symbolic
interactionism (e.g. George Herbert Mead) on the other hand has pointed out
that the development of consciousness can only be explained by assuming
societal interactions mediated by the usage of symbols. Both explanations are
reductionistic, they assume either consciousness or society as determining the
historical process. The emergence of the individual as a societal being can
only be explained adequately by a dialectical co-evolution of society
(especially categories such as labour and production) and human abilities. -
The
specific characteristic of life maintenance in society is the “conscious,
precautious disposal over common conditions of life by collective labour etc.”
(Holzkamp 1985: 184)[iv]. The
existence of society is not an end in itself, but the maintenance of the
existence of the individuals is the only sense of society. -
Society
exists mediated by the activities of human beings (where it doesn’t definitely
and fully determine thinking and actions – for more details see chapter 3 of
this essay and Fuchs 2002a, b; Schlemm 2001c), and constitutes its own sphere
that has its own logic of development (among other things by the means gaining
their societal meaning independent from the single human being). This sphere
can no longer be changed by the actions of single individuals directly. Society
exist always when human beings exist, also for those and in those who don’t
participate in its reproduction. One can say that society reproduces itself and
differs in this type of independence from immediate human actions in
co-operations. Co-operations only exist as long as the process lasts and only
for the participants. Part of a co-operation are only the participants, whereas
part of society are also those who don’t actively participate. Co-operations
are a different type of emergence than society. Co-operation is always
goal-directed, in society as such there is not a goal. Not only the
capitalistic valorisation-machine does have a systemic character, all types of
society have. -
On
the societal level the fundamental possibilities of human actions and the goals
of interactions and co-operation are determined – fundamental societal change
can only be achieved on this level. On the societal level, human beings can
consciously influence and change the conditions of their own being and
development. -
The
necessity of integrating individual reproduction into societal processes
results in the fact that each human being itself is a societal individual
(“societal nature of the human being”, see Schlemm 2001b). There are no “humans
without sociality” who are later socialised. Even the existence as single
producers of commodities and as egoistic competitors is their specific societal
way of existing. Individualisation does not firstly show up when individuals
enter market relationships, it is a societal process (and doesn’t correspond to
the “nature of the human being”). Hence Marx says that societal analysis has to
begin with “individuals producing in a society“ (Marx 1857: 615), these
individuals are “dependent and [...] belong to a larger whole“ (616). He
considers man as a zoon politikon (political animal) that is not only a
societal animal, but an animal that can be individualised only within society.
Man would be a societal being, the concept of a “solitary individual outside
society“ would be preposterous. -
The
sociality of the human being is not a causal or functional determination, it
enables and restrains his/her individuality. Each single individual can only
become a subject of its life by having possibilities of acting from which he
can select certain alternatives. These possibilities of actions are enabled by the societal
form of life processes. “From the outside” the structures and
functions of society can be described just like any other system, but then one
can’t explain why it is not just “a large community or co-operation” or the
“sum of its individuals”. From the point of view of the subject the difference
becomes clear: A large community or co-operation, a set of individuals, can
produce synergies and if necessary it can change scopes of action – but the existence of
specific human (individual) possibilities is due to the societal
mediation of human life (and the communities embedded in it).
Without societal embedding also an arbitrary sum of organisms couldn’t live in
a human way. With this characterisation of
the human being and society we deepen the understanding of what should be
considered as “natural”. For human beings their sociality is natural. All human
beings are “naturally societal” (see Schlemm 2001b). Within the relationship
unnatural/supernatural – natural the societal is part of the natural. But
within nature there are qualitative differences levels which allow us a
division into levels such as physical-chemical, the living and societal. In
this relationship frequently only the physical-chemical and biologically living
is seen as “nature” opposed to human society. We – as dialecticians – stress
the unity in which the diversity is sublated, hence also preserved. Societality
is our nature. There can be no “back to nature without sociality”. The mode of
our sociality, the mode of the treatment of the non-societal natural
“environment” can be designed in different ways. Sociality has its own momentum
that is relatively autonomous from the other moments of nature. Also the other
moments are in constant movement and change. “Nature is not the past”[v]
(Bloch 1985: 807). We have to take into account
that the capitalistic societal formation results in a destruction of natural
resources that shouldn’t be tolerated. The solution to this problem is not the
abandonment of appropriating nature because this would be the end of human
life. It is true for society that the
single individual can only develop itself freely if all others can also develop
themselves freely (although this is harmed in certain societal
formations). This is also true for the relationship of society and nature:
Society can only develop if it reasonably develops its relationship to nature –
nature can only prosper if it is enriched by the forms produced in society (so
called cultural landscapes). [i] In this paper we make a terminological
differentiation between ‘social’ and ‘societal’. There are social animals that
act instinctively together in order to achieve something, but there are no
animal societies. With the term societal we refer to the (necessary) existence
of the human being in society. Humans are social just like certain animals are.
But they are even more than that, they are societal beings, i.e. they have the
ability to consciously behave towards the world, to select from different
alternative actions and to actively change the conditions of their existence
which enable and constrain their choices and actions. [ii] “The animal merely uses external nature, and brings
about changes in it simply by his presence; man by his changes makes it serve
his ends, masters it. This
is the final, essential distinction between man and other animals, and once
again it is labour that brings about this distinction” (Engels 1876: 452). [iii] Translation from German [iv] Translated from German [v] Translated from German. „Die
Natur ist kein Vorbei“. This paper is published: Christian Fuchs, Annette Schlemm: The Self-Organization of Society. In: Zimmermann Rainer E.; Budanov, Vladimir G. (Eds)(2005): Towards Otherland. Languages of Science and Languages Beyond. INTAS Volume of Collected Essays 3. Kassel: kassel university press. p. 81-109.  
2002/03, publ. in 2005 - http://www.thur.de/philo/project/CA1.htm
- |